the vicinity of the crime, Connelly showed them the precise location of the killing. 28 Detective Antuna observed no indications that Connelly was suffering from any kind of mental illness.
9
The police held Connelly in custody overnight. 3 0 During an interview with a representative of the public defender's office the next day, Connelly, for the first time, became visibly disoriented. 3 1 The suspect was subsequently sent to a state hospital for psychological evaluation. 32 By March of 1984, the doctors evaluating Connelly concluded that he was competent to stand trial.
3 3
At a preliminary hearing before the trial, Connelly successfully moved to suppress all of the statements made to the officers of the Denver Police Department. 34 37 Id. Connelly revealed to Dr. Metzner that Connelly was following the "voice of God." This voice had instructed Connelly to obtain money, buy an airplane ticket, and fly from Boston to Denver. After arriving in Denver, the voice of "God" became more emphatic and told Connelly either to confess to the Junta killing or to commit suicide. Motivated by these supernatural suggestions, Connelly approached Officer Anderson determined to confess. Id. 38 Id. "Volitional ability" refers to one's "ability to make free and rational choices." Id. "Cognition" refers to "[klnowledge gained as through perception, reasoning, or intuition." N. WEBSTER, WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 278 (Anne H. Soukhanov ed. 1984).
39 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 519. Although Dr. Metzner admitted that the "voices" might actually have been Connelly's own interpretation of his guilt, Dr. Metzner asserted that in his judgment, Connelly's psychosis induced his confession. Id.
Based on this evidence, the Colorado trial court granted Connelly's motion to suppress his incriminating statements. 40 Even though the police officers had not engaged in any misconduct, the court found that the statements were "involuntary" and therefore inadmissible as a violation of Connelly's rights under the fourteenth amendment due process clause. 4 ' Relying upon the United States Supreme Court decisions in Townsend v. Swain 4 2 and Culombe v. Connecticut, 4 3 the trial court ruled that a confession is admissible only if it is a consequence of a defendant's "rational intellect and 'free will.' "44 Although the court found that the police had not wrongfully coerced Connelly into confessing, Connelly's mental condition had impaired his volitional abilities. 4 5 Therefore, Connelly had confessed without a rational intellect or free will. 4 6 The court held, furthermore, that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of proving by "clear and convincing" evidence that Connelly voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights to obtain counsel and to remain silent. 4 7 Consequently, the trial 'court suppressed both Connelly's initial statements to Officer Anderson and his custodial confessions. 48 The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the trial court's ruling. 49 The court emphasized that " [t] he ultimate test of voluntariness is whether the statement was the product of a rational intellect and a free will." 50 Moreover, the court explained, involuntariness may be the result of other influences, such as severe mental illness, which negate rational judgment and free choice and may exist in the absence of any police coercion. 5 1 The court held that the evidence supported a finding that Connelly's initial statements were not the product of rational judgment and free choice. 5 2 Furthermore, be- 40 Id. 41 Id. For the relevant text of the fourteenth amendment, see supra note 2. 42 372 U.S. 293 (1963) . 43 367 U.S. 568 (1961) . 44 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 519 (quoting Record at 16). 45 Id. 46 Id. 47 Id. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)("The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently."). For a more complete account of the trial court's ruling, see People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 725-26 (Colo. 1985) . The trial court also held that Connelly could not have waived his right to counsel and the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination in his mentally damaged state. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 519. 48 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 519. 49 People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1985) . 50 Id. at 728.
51 Id. 52 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 519.
cause of Connelly's mental state, the court concluded that the adequate waiver of his rights while in custody was impossible. 5 3 The Colorado Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the lower court's suppression of Connelly's statements. 54 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and considered two issues. First, the Court analyzed whether Connelly's precustodial or custodial statements made in a mental condition which interfered with "rational intellect" and "free will" should be suppressed as "involuntary" under the fourteenth amendment due process clause. 55 Second, the Court considered whether the state's burden in proving a defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights should be a lower "preponderance" standard 5 6 or a more strenuous "dear and convincing" or "reasonable doubt" standard. 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE "VOLUNTARINESS" STANDARD FOR

SUSPECT CONFESSIONS.
Beginning with its decision in Brown v. Mississippi, 58 the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the fourteenth amendment due process clause protects an accused from the use of evidence garnered through an "involuntary" confession. The Brown Court held that the use of torture to procure a confession violates a defendant's right to due process of law. 59 In each case after Brown in which the Court has found a confession "involuntary," police officials have likewise acted in a coercive or threatening manner. 55 Id. at 519-22. 56 For a brief examination of the various evidentiary standards, see infra note 72. 57 Id. at 522-24. 58 297 U.S. 278 (1936). In Brown, the police gathered three black men who the police suspected of committing a murder. Id. at 281-82. After each man had denied any involvement in the crime, the police hanged and severely whipped the "suspects" until they confessed to the satisfaction of their interrogators. Id.
59 Id. at 285-87. The Brown Court stated that "[i]t would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process." Id. at 286. 60 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)(police interrogated defendant for four hours while he was under sedation and in "unbearable" pain in hospital intensive care unit); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961)(police held defendant for four days and denied him medical attention and adequate food until he confessed); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944)(police and "highly trained" lawyers interrogated defendant for thirty-six hours and denied him rest and sleep).
forms of persuasion. 61 The Court, therefore, has often focused on the mental condition of a defendant to determine the defendant's ability at the time of the interrogation to withstand such persuasion. 68 Id. at 211. Employing a "totality of the circumstances" approach, the Blackburn Court considered "the eight-to nine-hour sustained interrogation in a tiny room which was upon occasion literally filled with police officers; the absence of Blackburn's friends, relatives, or legal counsel; [and] the composition of the confession by the Deputy Sheriff rather than by Blackburn." Id. at 207-08. The Court stated that "in cases involving involuntary confessions, this Court enforces the strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will." Id. at 206-07. 69 372 U.S. 293 (1963) . In Townsend, the defendant, was a nineteen-year-old heroin addict with the intelligence level of slightly above a "moron" at the time of the interrogation. Id. at 303. confession which was not tle product of a free intellect. 70 As a resuit, Townsend's confession was ruled inadmissible. 7 1 Traditionally, therefore, the Supreme Court has carefully examined a defendant's state of mind when considering a confession's "involuntariness."
On the other hand, the Court has required the state to prove the "voluntariness" of a confession only by a "preponderance" of the evidence, not by "clear and convincing" evidence. 72 In Lego v. Twomey, 7 3 the Court upheld a state practice requiring the less burdensome "preponderance of evidence" standard in establishing the voluntariness of a confession. 7 4 In upholding the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling, the Lego plurality examined the purposes for suppressing confessions. 75 According to the Lego Court, coerced confessions are not suppressed because of any inherent unreliability. Rather, "[t]he use of coerced confessions, whether true or false, is forbidden because the method used to extract them offends constitutional principles." 77 Thus, the Court concluded, the "voluntariness" calculus is unrelated to the substantive issue of innocence or guilt. 78 Jury verdicts, therefore, are not rendered more unreliable 70 Id. at 308. The police gave the suspect pain relief from his withdrawal symptoms as well as a drug with "truth-serum" properties. Id. at 298-99. After the administration of the drug, Townsend readily confessed. Id. at 299.
71 Id. at 299. 72 A preponderance of evidence "is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not." BLACK'S LAw Di-rnoNAtY 1064 (5th ed. 1979). On the other hand, clear and convincing proof means "proof beyond a reasonable, i.e., a well-founded doubt." Id. at 227. Typically, clear and convincing proof "is intermediate, being more than preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases." Id.
73 404 U.S. 477 (1972) . 74 Id. In Lego, the testimony of the defendant conflicted with that of the police concerning the use of physical violence by police interrogators. Id. at 480. The trial judge admitted the defendant's confession but did not instruct the jury that they had to find that the confession was voluntarily made before using it to determine a verdict. Id. at 481. On appeal, Lego argued that the "trial judge should have found the confession voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt before admitting it into evidence." Id. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the "reasonable doubt" standard in favor of a "preponderance" standard. Id.
75 Id. at 482-87. 76 Id. at 484-85 (citingJackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)). In Jackson, the petitioner was found guilty of murder after the trial court allowed his confession into evidence. Jackson, 378 U.S. at 374-75. The Supreme Court, however, rejected the state procedure which allowed the jury to consider the issue of "voluntariness" of the confession along with the issues determining the innocence or guilt of the accused. 80 police officials have been required to explicitly inform suspects in a custodial interrogation of the suspects' right to counsel and privilege against selfincrimination. However, a suspect may waive his rights guaranteed by Miranda if his waiver is "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." 8 ' Neither Miranda nor its progeny, however, had established exactly what burden of proof the state must meet in order to successfully prove a valid waiver of Miranda rights. The Miranda Court, though, did state that "a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel." '8 2 The Court also asserted that it has always required "high" standards of proof for the establishment of a waiver of constitutional rights. 8 3 Post-Miranda cases have similarly required the state to meet a "high" or "heavy" burden in proving a valid waiver of Miranda rights. 8 4 However, the Court has never explicitly defined whether a "heavy" burden of proof requires a "preponderance," "clear and convincing," or "reasonable doubt" standard.
In analyzing whether a confession is "voluntary, knowing, and On appeal, the prosecution asserted that the petitioner had effectively waived his sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. at 463-64. In determining if the petitioner had "intelligently" waived his right to counsel, the Johnson Court stated that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights .. " Id. at 464.
84 For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
intelligent," the Court has divided the inquiry into two distinct "dimensions":
First the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation" reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.
85
According to the Moran Court, therefore, a defendant may not be coerced by the police into waiving his Miranda rights, and the defendant must be able to understand the consequences of his Miranda waiver. 725 (1979) ). In Moran, the defendant was advised of his rights, interrogated, and later signed a confession statement. Id. at 1139. The police, however, refused to let the defendant see the attorney that the defendant's sister had procured for him. Id. The Court held that the defendant's waiver of both his right to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination was valid because he knew the consequences of his acts even in the absence of his counsel. At the outset, the majority discussed the application of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 93 ChiefJustice Rehnquist pointed out that the Supreme Court recently had held that certain police interrogation tactics were so offensive to the notion of due process that the misconduct had to be condemned. 9 4 According to the majority, the impetus for the ruling in Brown v. Mississippi 9 5 was coercive government misconduct. 9 6 The Brown Court held that the use of confessions obtained through torturous means was clearly "revolting to the sense of justice" and a clear denial of due process. 9 7 Thus, according to the Connelly majority, the due process focus in confession cases revolves around police misconduct.
98
Analyzing the post-Brown line of confession cases, ChiefJustice Rehnquist concluded that this due process focus on police misconduct has, without exception, provided the basis for considering a confession's "involuntariness." 99 The Chief Justice conceded that each of the confession cases had been decided on its own particular facts. 0 0 He emphasized, however, that in each confession case in which the Court found that suspects' statements were given involuntarily, the unifying thread was some variation of police misconduct in procuring the confession.' 0 ' More recently, the Court noted, as 8 SUPREME COURT REVIEW police officials have employed subtler forms of "psychological persuasion" in interrogations, courts have placed greater emphasis on the mental condition of the defendant in a voluntariness analysis.
The majority stressed, however, that a court should never rely solely on a defendant's mental condition in a "voluntariness" determination. 10 3 According to the Connelly majority, therefore, official coercion is a necessary element in deciding that a confession has been given involuntarily.
0 4 Without such conduct, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, "there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law."' Thus, according to the majority, Blackburn's mental condition was not dispositive of the "voluntariness" question. 10 9 Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized the use of a two-pronged analysis, relying upon the Townsend Court's inquiry into both the state's impermissible conduct as well as the detainee's mental condition in a determination of "voluntariness." 1 10 Thus, the Connelly majority concluded that although an individual's mental condition is germaine in determining his susceptibility to police coercion, a court must go beyond examining only the mental state of a defendant in a due process inquiry."'
The Chief Justice also discussed the requisite "state action" needed to invoke the application of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 112 Although the police committed no wrongful acts, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that at- tempting to admit Connelly's statements into evidence constituted sufficient "state action" in order to invoke the application of the due process clause." 3 Therefore, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, the Supreme Court of Colorado concluded that state action existed for the purposes of the due process clause even though no impermissible police action existed."14 Finally, the majority considered several policy issues which further established the necessity of a link between coercive activity by the state and the resulting confession's "involuntariness." ' "1 5 First, the majority argued that without this necessary link and in the absence of police coercion, a court's ruling on admissibility would have to consider a defendant's every motivation for making incriminating statements. 1 6 Moreover, even the most extreme behavior by a private party attempting to gather evidence against a defendant has historically failed to make that evidence inadmissible under the due process clause. 117 ChiefJustice Rehnquist also focused on the cost to society's interest in law enforcement resulting from the exclusion of relevant evidence." 8 Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the purpose of excluding improperly seized evidence is to substantially deter future violations of constitutional protections.' ' The suppression of Connelly's statements, according to the Chief 113 People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 728-29 (1985) . 114 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521. 115 In part, ChiefJustice Rehnquist was responding to the Supreme Court of Colorado's analysis which implicitly rejected a necessary link between these two elements. Justice, would not serve any purpose in enforcing constitutional guarantees. 120 Thus, the majority concluded that "[o]nly if we were to establish a brand new constitutional right-the right of a criminal defendant to confess his crime only when totally rational and properly motivated-could respondent's present claim be sustained."' 2 '
Additionally, ChiefJustice Rehnquist addressed the purposes of the criminal trial itself, noting that the exclusion of evidence naturally deflects the trial process from its goal of determining the guilt or innocence of an accused. 22 The Court rejected Connelly's contentions that the Court should "make sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed" in the absence of police coercion. 1 2 3 Rather, according to the majority, the defendant's mental state and its effect on his statements to police officials, absent police misconduct, is best left to state laws governing rules of evidence. 124 In dismissing the issue of the reliability of such a confession, the majority concluded that " 'It]he aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.' "125 The issue of reliability, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, is best left to the individual states' rules of evidence.'
The Connelly majority, therefore, held that coercive police activity is a prerequisite to a finding that a suspect's statements are "involuntary" within the meaning of the due process clause.
7
Because the police did not mistreat or coerce Connelly into making self-incriminating statements in this case, the Court held that the statements could be admitted into evidence without a constitutional transgression. Initially, ChiefJustice Rehnquist conceded that a "heavy" burden rests on the state to prove that the defendant waived both his right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination. 3 3 However, the majority opinion stressed that the Supreme Court had never held a "heavy" burden to mean the "clear and convincing" standard.' 3 4 ChiefJustice Rehnquist utilized Lego v. Twomey 13 5 and its progeny which require a "preponderance" of evidence to prove the voluntariness of a confession.' 3 6 He argued that a trial court should require the same preponderance standard in proving the voluntariness of a waiver of rights guaranteed by Miranda. 137 In Lego, the Supreme Court upheld a state practice requiring only a preponderance of evidence in establishing the voluntariness of a confession.1 3 8 Chief Justice Rehnquist in Connelly argued that this practice was upheld for two reasons. First, although proving the elements of a crime naturally requires a reasonable doubt standard, the voluntariness determination does not relate to the actual elements of a crime.' 3 9 On the contrary, the majority noted, the voluntariness determination is designed to protect against police coercion. 1 serve the values protected by the exclusionary rule. 4 1 Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out, the independent values of the exclusionary rule are not sufficient to require the state to prove admissibility beyond a reasonable doubt. 14 2 Furthermore, there was no evidence that federal rights have been hurt by the preponderance standard. 143 The Chief Justice asserted that the proper burden of proof at "voluntariness" suppression hearings is a preponderance standard.1 44 The Court concluded by equating the confession and waiver requirements, stating that "[i]f as we held in Lego v. Twomey... the voluntariness of a confession need be established only by a preponderance of the evidence, then a waiver of the auxiliary protection established in Miranda should require no higher burden of proof."' 45 Thus, the Court held that the state must only meet a preponderance standard in proving Connelly's waiver of his Miranda rights. 146 Based upon his interpretation of Lego and the burden of proof required for waiver, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Supreme Court of Colorado erred in its determination that Connelly did not properly waive his Miranda rights.' 4 7 While conceding that a suspect's waiver of his Miranda rights need to be "voluntary," Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the Colorado court improperly injected the concept of "free will" into this constitutional context.' 4 8 The Miranda warnings, the Chief Justice asserted, are designed to protect suspects' fifth amendment rights in the face of governmental coercion. 14 9 However, the fifth amendment, according to the majority, does not protect suspects against psychological pressures to confess motivated by factors outside of official state actions. 150 In Connelly, ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted that during the interrogation of Connelly, the police never acted improperly or coerced a statement from him.' 5 ' Although Connelly's confession may have been "coerced" in a psychological or philosophical sense, such compulsion does not render his waiver of Miranda rights invalid, according to the ChiefJustice's rationale. 152 The majority only recognized compulsion resulting from government coercion; all other types of "compulsions" or "involuntariness" are matters "to which the United States Constitution does not speak. On the other hand, Justice Stevens argued that Connelly's postcustodial statements were made in the absence of a valid waiver of his Miranda rights.' 6 3 Any waiver of Miranda protections, Justice Stevens asserted, must be " 'voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice.' "164 Because Connelly could not exercise "free will" in a waiver of his Miranda rights, Justice Stevens reasoned, the post-custodial interrogation was necessarily coercive. 165 Justice Brennan's dissent centered around his willingness to extend the due process "voluntariness" inquiry beyond the confines of police misconduct. 173 The dissent, relying on the same precedent employed by the majority, attempted to demonstrate how the admission of the statements of a mentally ill individual is "antithetical to due process."' 74 Justice Brennan refused to interpret these authorities as establishing police coercion as the ultimate test of a confession's "involuntariness" for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment.' 7 5 Rather, he identified Connelly as a case of first impression because the Court had never explicitly confined its due 170 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan carefully detailed Connelly's long history of mental problems. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Connelly had been hospitalized five times for psychiatric reasons. He also heard imaginary voices, claimed he saw nonexistent objects, and thought that he wasJesus and his father was God. Justice Brennan emphasized that Dr. Meztner testified that " 'when [Connelly] was read his Miranda rights, he probably had the capacity to know that he was being read his Miranda rights [but] he wasn't able to use that information because of the command hallucinations that he had experienced.'" Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Record at 56-57). . He emphasized, however, that in each of these cases the Court has clearly focused on the presence or absence of "free will" and that this factor should be an independent concern. See id. at 527-28 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398-99 (1977)(concluding that defendant could not exercise "a rational intellect and free will" when police questioned him in a hospital, defendant was in "unbearable" pain and encumbered by tubes, needles, and breathing apparatus); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1960)(deciding that a confession is not "the product of a rational intellect and free will" if "the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed"); Ashcraft v. It is not significant that the drug may have been administered and the questions asked by persons unfamiliar with hyoscine's properties as a "truth serum," if these properties exist. Any questioning by police officers which in fact produces a confession which is not the product of a free intellect renders that confession inadmissible. The Court has usually so stated the test. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 308-09 (emphasis in original))(footnote omitted). 182 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 183 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated: In Blackburn v. Alabama ... we held irrelevant the absence of evidence of improper purpose on the part of the questioning officers. There the evidence indicated that the interrogating officers thought the defendant sane when he confessed, but we judged the confession inadmissible because the probability was that the defendant was in fact insane at the time.
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Brennan asserted, ignored this precedent. 1 84 Even if "involuntariness" does require state action, Justice Brennan argued that police overreaching is not the only form of state misconduct justifying the suppression of a confession. 185 The dissent asserted that a trial court's admission of a confession into evidence constitutes sufficient "state action" for the purposes of the due process clause. 186 Therefore, Justice Brennan reasoned that the action of a trial court in knowingly admitting a statement which was not a product of an accused's free will would constitute sufficient state misconduct to warrant an involuntariness analysis under the due process clause. Like the majority opinion, the dissenting opinion details the various policy factors to be considered in the confession analysis. In response to Chief Justice Rehnquist's concern that courts should not be required to "divine" a suspect's motivation to confess, Justice Brennan noted that the courts traditionally have examined the "totality of circumstances, including the motivation and competence of the defendant, in determining whether a confession is voluntary."' 8 8 Moreover, Justice Brennan pointed out that the majority admitted that in recent years interrogators have increasingly utilized psychological pressures instead of physical coercion. 8 9 This use of psychological pressure, according to Justice Brennan, is inconsistent with the majority's argument that, historically, courts will only admit confessions given as a result of free will. 190 Justice Brennan's main policy concern centered on the reliability of confessions given by mentally ill individuals. 19 investigation and not on a suspect's confession. 1 9 2 Justice Brennan explained that the heightened use of unreliable confessions will lead to a less reliable and more easily abused system of justice.1 9 3 According to Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process clause has reflected the foundations of the accusatorial system and its concern with reliability.' 94 Justice Brennan observed that much of our mistrust surrounding the use of confessions stems from the great impact confessions have upon the trier of fact. 19 5 The reliability of a confession, accordingly, must be carefully analyzed before the fact finder has an opportunity to consider the confession in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence. 196 In Connelly, Justice Brennan pointed out, the record revealed that the defendant was actively hallucinating and highly delusional at the time of his incriminating statements. 19 7 Furthermore, Justice Brennan noted, Chief Justice Rehnquist himself observed that a " 'statement rendered by one in the condition of respondent might prove to be quite unreliable.' " 198 The reliability problem in Connelly was compounded, according to the dissent, because no other physical evidence implicated Connelly with the crime. 19 9 At a minimum, Justice Brennan concluded, a trial court should make an inquiry into evidence extrinsic to the confession of a mentally ill person before admitting an inherently unreliable confession into evidence. In the second portion of his dissent, Justice Brennan concluded that the majority had improperly considered two issues involving Miranda v. Arizona 20 1 which the state had not raised in its petition for certiorari: the burden of proof that the state must meet in establishing the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights, and "the effect of mental illness on the waiver of those rights in the absence of police misconduct." 20 2 Justice Brennan "emphatically" dissented from the Court's holding that the state must meet only a preponderance standard to prove a valid waiver of Miranda rights. 20 3 Justice Brennan also dissented from the Court's conclusion that any waiver is automatically voluntary as long as it occurs without evidence of police misconduct.
4
Relying initially on the Miranda decision itself, Justice Brennan claimed that the majority ignored clear precedent mandating a heavier burden of establishing a valid waiver of Miranda rights than a mere preponderance standard. 20 5 He affirmed the Miranda Court's rationale:
"If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, and we re-assert these standards as applied to in-custody interrogation." Supreme Court precedent by requiring only a preponderance standard. illness, would be admitted. 2 20 In the dissent's view, the reliability of such confessions is questionable. 22 ' Because the admission of confessions given by mentally incapacitated defendants can affect the reliability of jury verdicts, Justice Brennan concluded, a higher evidentiary standard is appropriate. 2 22 Finally, the dissent distinguished Lego by pointing out that Lego involved a non-custodial situation and that Connelly involved the waiver of Miranda rights in a custodial setting. 2 2 3 Because the potential for police abuses increases in the "coercive custodial interrogation atmosphere," Justice Brennan argued that the government should be required to prove a waiver of Miranda rights under a higher standard of proof.
24
Turning to the requirement that a waiver of Miranda rights must be knowing and intelligent, Justice Brennan attempted to demonstrate that Connelly's mental condition made a knowing and intelligent waiver impossible. 2 25 Employing Moran v. Burbine, 2 26 the dissent argued that the determination of knowing and intelligent waiver involves two elements. 2 2 7 First, the police must not have coerced or deceived a defendant into making a waiver. 22 8 Second, the defendant must have fully understood the nature of the rights abandoned and must have comprehended the consequences of such an action. 2 2 9 Moreover, according to Justice Brennan, "[t]he two requirements are independent: '[o]nly if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court prop-220 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 221 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 222 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also explained that the Lego decision has been criticized for never adequately demonstrating why the preponderance standard would be more appropriate than the more intermediate clear and convincing standard. Id. at n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
223 Id. at 532 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice Brennan misread Lego. The Lego defendant was in custody at the time of his confession. Lego, 404 U.S. at 480 ("The evidence introduced against Lego at trial included a confession he had made to police after arrest and while in custody at the station house.")(emphasis added).
224 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 532. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent also argued that even if the lower standard of proof is the appropriate one, the state still failed to prove its case. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to the Supreme Court of Colorado, Dr. Metzner, the state psychiatrist, established that Connelly was unable to make a "free decision" concerning his Miranda rights. Id. at 532-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Therefore, Justice Brennan concluded, it was impossible for Connelly to "voluntarily" waive his rights. Id. at 533 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
225 See id. at 533 (Brennan, J., dissenting Addressing the task facing the Colorado Supreme Court on remand, the dissent pointed out that the majority did not consider the knowing and intelligent requirements of the waiver question.
3 2
Justice Brennan also stressed that the majority left the Colorado Supreme Court "free on remand to reconsider other issues not inconsistent with the Court's opinion." 23 3 Therefore, the dissent concluded, the Colorado Supreme Court should be able to independently consider whether Connelly knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. 
IX. ANALYSIS
A. THE DUE PROCESS "VOLUNTARINESS" STANDARD: A NECESSARY
LINK WITH STATE MISCONDUCT
The majority in Colorado v. Connelly accurately described the necessary connection between police misconduct and the determination of the "involuntariness" of a confession. 2 3 5 Forces outside police misconduct may provide compulsion which impairs a suspect's volitional abilities. Without some degree of police overreaching, however, confessions resulting from such compulsion are not involuntary under the fourteenth amendment due process clause. On the contrary, the underlying goals of a criminal trial mandate the admission of a confession despite the "inducement" imposed by a mental illness. The reliability of a confession, moreover, is an inquiry better suited for the states' rules of evidence rather than the constitutional voluntariness analysis.
The Connelly dissent unconvincingly argued that the Court could find a confession involuntary in the absence of police miscon-230 Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting)(quotingMoran, 106 S. Ct. at 1141)(emphasis added by Justice Brennan). 231 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) . 232 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court reverses the entire judgment, however, without explaining how a 'mistaken view of voluntariness' could 'taint' this independent justification for suppressing the custodial confession.")(emphasis added).
233 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 234 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also emphasized that the majority ruling in Connelly did not preclude a contrary decision by the Supreme Court of Colorado based upon the court's interpretation of its own state constitution. Id. (Brennan,J.,  dissenting) . 235 For the examination of the majority's "voluntariness" analysis, see supra notes 87-128 and accompanying text.
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[Vol. 78 duct. Justice Brennan asserted that a confession should be suppressed whenever a defendant confesses as a result of any type of compulsion, even if the police did not act improperly. 2 36 The dissent, unfortunately, misinterpreted fifty years of Supreme Court due process jurisprudence. This misreading resulted from a reliance on excerpts from Supreme Court opinions taken out of context from the original discussions. For instance, Justice Brennan stated: "The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? . . . The line of distinction is that at which governing self-direction is lost and compulsion, of whatever nature or however infused, propels or helps to propel the confession." 240 Id. at 607-21. 241 Id. at 606-2 1. Culombe, moreover, appeared in court on a fictitious breach-of-thepeace charge. Id. at 632. In court, Culombe was placed in a wire cage in the corner of the room. In addition to enduring a courtroom crowded with photographers and hostile townspeople, Culombe was not represented by an attorney although he had requested one. The Supreme Court explained that these coercive tactics gave the police more time to pursue the investigation and enabled them to improperly intimidate Culombe. Id. at 612. 242 Id. at 612. The Culombe Court stated that "what must enter our judgment about Culombe's mental equipment-that he is suggestible and subject to intimidation-does not permit us to attribute to him powers of resistance comparable to those [who possess normal mental capacity]." Id. at 625.
be 'not whether the conduct of state officers is shocking, but whether the confession was "free and voluntary". .' ",243 Justice Brennan, though, omitted much of this sentence quoted from Malloy v. Hogan. In the same sentence that Justice Brennan quoted, the Malloy Court went on to qualify the "free and voluntary" standard by stating:
[T]hat is, [the confession] must not be extracted by any sort of threat or violence, or obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any other improper influence.... In other words the person must not have been compelled to incriminate himself.
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The Connelly dissent, therefore, omitted the significant Malloy qualification that the words "free and voluntary" refered to the absence of state compulsion. The Culombe and Malloy language relied on by the Connelly dissent in the introduction of its own voluntariness analysis, then, explicitly stated that voluntariness was necessarily predicated on police misconduct and not on some independent notion of choice unconstrained by compulsions of any kind. The Culombe Court examined the defendant's mental state simply to determine if the suspect could have resisted the actual state misconduct.
24 5 Ironically, the defendant's mental condition in Malloy was not even an issue in that case. The Blackburn and Townsend cases, relied upon by both the majority and dissent in Connelly, 2 47 did not support Justice Brennan's contention that mental condition alone may determine a confession's involuntariness. The dissent stated that " '[a]ny questioning by police officers which in fact produces a confession which is not the product of a free intellect renders that confession inadmissible.' "248 Implicit in the Townsend Court's analysis, however, was the critical causal connection between police conduct and the resulting confes- 243 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 527 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1963)). 244 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7. 245 Culombe, 367 U.S. at 621-35. 246 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963). The police arrested Malloy in a gambling raid. After he refused to answer questions at a state gambling inquiry because his answers might have incriminated him, the court held Malloy in contempt. The court ordered that Malloy be held in jail until he chose to answer the questions. The United States Supreme Court held that under the fourteenth amendment, Malloy properly invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 3. The Court never questioned Malloy's mental condition.
247 See supra notes 106-11 and 177-84 and accompanying text. 248 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 528 (Brennan,J., dissenting)(quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 308 (emphasis added by Justice Brennan)).
sion. Justice Brennan ignored the fact that in Townsend it was the police who administered the "truth serum" and pain relievers to the defendant. 24 9 Unlike the police in Connelly, therefore, the officers in Townsend did more than simply question the defendant. Despite the fact that Townsend may have had his volitional abilities impaired, the police administration of the drug was a factor which produced Townsend's confession. 250 Justice Brennan, furthermore, inappropriately relied on the Townsend Court's deemphasis of police motive in its discussion of Blackburn v. Alabama. 2 5 1 Thus, the dissent concluded that "the Townsend Court interpreted Blackburn as a case involving a confession by a mentally ill defendant in which the police harbored no improper purpose." 252 Although the Blackburn Court did conclude that police motives were irrelevent, the Court did not hold that the confession was involuntary exclusively on the basis of the defendant's mental condition at the time of his confession. 2 53 The Blackburn Court considered all of the relevant factors involved in the defendant's confession-including the police actions and Blackburn's mental state-in its decision to render his statements inadmissible. 2 54 Moreover, a. court logically should examine the actual conduct of the police rather than their motives in determining if there was any coercion involved. 2 55 Without the requisite police action, police motives or knowledge do little by themselves to induce a confession. If the state conduct is sufficient to coerce a confession, then the confession should be involuntary and inadmissible under the due process clause regardless of the police motives at the time of the coercive conduct. The Townsend Court, in concluding that the Court in Black- 249 Townsend, 372 U.S. at 298-99. 250 Id. at 307-08. 251 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Townsend, 372 U.S. at 309). The Townsend Court concluded that police knowledge of the drug's properties as a truth serum was inconsequential. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 308. Justice Brennan stated:
"[I]n Blackburn v. Alabama .... we held irrelevant the absence of evidence of improper purpose on the part of the questioning officers. There the evidence indicated that the interrogating officers thought the defendant sane when he confessed, but we judged the confession inadmissible because the probability was that the defendant was in fact insane at the time." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added by justice Brennan)(citation omitted)). 252 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 253 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 254 See id. 255 In Townsend, the critical element was that the police acted as a conscious force in administering the drug regardless of their motive or knowledge of the drug's effects. The actual administration of the drug, not the intangible motive behind the decision to administer the narcotic, induced the confession.
burn held the defendant's confession involuntary solely because of his mental condition, ignored the Blackburn Court's analysis of all the situational elements involved with the confession. Justice Brennan's reliance on the Townsend Court's conclusion, therefore, was unwarranted. Overall, then, the authorities thatJustice Brennan relied upon did not justify a conclusion that due process involuntariness may be established in the absence of police misconduct. Chief Justice Rehnquist accurately determined, therefore, that "while mental condition is surely relevant to an individual's susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of the defendant's state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry." 2 56
Chief Justice Rehnquist also correctly concluded that although uncoerced confessions of a mentally ill individual may raise questions about the inherent unreliability of such statements, this reliability determination is not part of the due process inquiry. 2 57 Juries may not rely on coerced confessions, whether they are true or false, because " 'the method used to extract them offends constitutional principles.' "258 Justice Frankfurter, writing the opinion for the 293 (1963) . Therefore, although the majority accurately concluded that police misconduct is at least an indispensible prerequisite to a finding of involuntariness, the Court historically has focused on a defendant's mental condition in determining the impact of such state misconduct. 257 See Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522. "A statement rendered by one in the condition of [Connelly] might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum, see, e.g., Fed 
SELF-INCRIMINATION: MENTALLY IMPAIRED
The voluntariness analysis, therefore, "[is] not aimed at reducing the possibility of convicting innocent men. ' 26 0 To the contrary, the voluntariness calculus is designed to protect the right of a suspect against self-incrimination. 2 6 ' Justice Brennan's insistence on using the involuntariness determination as a forum for analyzing reliability, then, is without historical precedent. As the majority in Connelly noted, a trial court should allow the fact-finder, restricted only by the states' rules of evidence, to undertake a determination of a confession's reliability. 2 6 2 Because the guilt or innocence of a defendant may hinge on the confession's effect on the jury, the concern for the reliability of such a powerfully persuasive piece of evidence is undoubtedly important. A defendant has been as free sinceJackson as he was before to familiarize a jury with circumstances that attend the taking of his confession, including facts bearing upon its weight and voluntariness. In like measure, of course, juries have been at liberty to disregard confessions that are insufficiently corroborated or otherwise deemed unworthy of belief.
5
It is the responsibility of defense counsel, therefore, to attack the reliability of the confession in court as he or she would attack the reliability of any other evidence. 2 66 The voluntariness determination simply attempts to protect against confessions obtained in violation of the due process clause.
67
If the trial judge were to engage in a reliability analysis, he or she would have to "divine" the reasons why the defendant chose to make incriminating statements. 2 68 The analysis of a defendant's mental condition is, by its nature, an imprecise science. Without police coercion, a court would have to engage in the hairsplitting task of finding the exact reason why a defendant confessed. A number of different reasons could explain how or why an individual confessed in the absence of police misconduct. Justice Brennan, on the other hand, explained that the majority's concern with this divining process was unwarranted because courts typically engage in a "totality of the circumstances" analysis. 2 69 But the dissent oversimplified the "totality" analysis involved in a case such as Connelly's in which the determinative issue is the defendant's mentally impaired state. 2 70 In previous cases in which the mental state of the defendant was at issue, the Court has examined a wide variety of elements in a voluntariness determination, including the length of interrogation, the tactics used by the police, the race of the defendant, the absence of the suspect's counsel and friends, and the composing of the statement by the officers as opposed to the defendant. 2 71 Unlike a determination of the defendant's state of mind, a court can more easily quantify and evaluate these situational elements. If a court only has a defendant's state of mind to analyze, the task of determining the actual impetus to confess is excessively subjective. The question of why an individual confesses outside of police coercion, therefore, is an inquiry for the jury when it considers the truthfulness or reliability of a confession.
Admitting a mentally ill individual's confession as "voluntary" without evidence of police misconduct, then, does not violate that defendant's rights under the fourteenth amendment. A confession cannot be involuntary under the due process rubric in the absence of police coercion. The reliability of a confession, therefore, should be examined by the trier of fact when considering the substantive issues relating to the defendant's guilt or innocence. As a further precaution, however, a trial judge should specifically warn the jury to guard against equating voluntariness with reliability or truthfulness. In the absence of police coercion in Connelly, the Supreme Court correctly allowed Connelly's statements into evidence. 268 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521. 269 Id. at 529 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the majority admitted that a defendant's state of mind has recently played a more significant role in an "involuntariness" determination. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) . 270 Neither the majority nor the dissent in Connelly questioned whether the police conduct was coercive. 274 Historically, the Court has implicitly required a higher standard, such as a "dear and convincing" or a "reasonable doubt" standard, for proving a knowing and intelligent waiver. 27 5 Moreover, although Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights, he neglected to explicitly examine whether Connelly knowingly and intelligently waived his rights.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist argued for a less strenuous preponderance standard for the inquiry into the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver. The ChiefJustice equated the policies discussed in Lego discouraging the use of involuntary confessions with the policies discouraging the procurement of involuntary waivers of Miranda rights. 27 6 Like the "voluntariness" required for the admissibility of a confession, the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights is unrelated to the specific elements of a given crime. Courts exclude evidence because of constitutional violations of defendants' rights. 2 77 272 ChiefJustice Rehnquist analyzed the voluntariness of the confession in his discussion of the appropriate standard of proof for a waiver of Miranda rights. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522-23. However, he never explicitly limited the application of the confession "voluntariness" analysis to the voluntariness component of a Miranda waiver. He concluded that "the State need prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence" and "a waiver of the auxiliary protection established in Miranda should require no higher burden of proof [than the preponderance standard]." Id. at 523. The only logical interpretation of the majority's language is that ChiefJustice Rehnquist required the preponderance standard for the whole of the Miranda waiver as opposed to only the voluntariness component. burden of proof required to prove the voluntariness of a confession with the burden required to prove the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights. Justice Brennan's Connelly dissent, though, advocating a higher burden of proof because of a confession's potential unreliability, failed to refute Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument analogizing the voluntariness of a confession with the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights. Relying on his dissent in Lego, Justice Brennan demonstrated how a lower standard of proof necessarily results in the conviction of more innocent people. 28 7 The less strenuous preponderance standard, he argued, allows a court to admit more involuntary confessions. 2 88 The admission of a higher number of involuntary confessions, he asserted, increases the likelihood of the admission of unreliable confessions. 28 9 Justice Brennan concluded that the admittance of more unreliable confessions necessarily results in more convictions of innocent people. 290 In his Connelly dissent, Justice Brennan also emphasized the strong persuasive effect of a confession on the jury. 2 9 ' Justice Brennan, however, failed to note that courts employ exclusionary rules for concerns other than the reliability of the evidence. As ChiefJustice Rehnquist detailed, courts exclude evidence to protect against violations of the Constitution and not to protect against inherently unreliable evidence. 29 2 The trial process, through its evidentiary protections, is designed to protect the defendant in confession situations. A possibly unreliable confession, like any other evidence, should be considered by the jury and properly weighed. Therefore, although Justice Brennan validly argued that more unreliable confessions will mean that more innocent people may be convicted, the standard of proof in the voluntariness calculus was not designed to cure this problem.
The majority, moreover, left the analysis of Connelly's attempted waiver incomplete. The Miranda Court held that a waiver of fifth amendment rights must be knowing and intelligent as well as voluntary. 2 93 Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, failed to explicitly evaluate whether Connelly's waiver was both knowing and intelligent. Instead, ChiefJustice Rehnquist concluded that a lower stan-Connelly knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. The Supreme Court in Moran v. Burbine 303 recently concluded that a knowing and intelligent waiver "must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. ' ' 3O4 Unlike the defendant in Moran, however, Connelly suffered from a mental illness which impaired his volitional control. 30 5 Although Connelly may have understood his rights at the time they were read to him, his volitional impairment likely vitiated a clear understanding of the consequences of a waiver of Miranda rights. The Colorado Supreme Court, moreover, concluded that a waiver of Connelly's Miranda rights had been impossible because he clearly had been unable to make an "intelligent" decision without this volitional control. 3 06 The Court, therefore, should have affirmed the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling upholding the suppression of Connelly's custodial statements.
Overall, the fourteenth amendment's protection against the state's use of an "involuntary" confession did not mandate suppression of either Connelly's precustodial or custodial statements. However, because Miranda and its progeny have required more than the preponderance standard asserted by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Connelly's custodial statements should have been suppressed. The only statements that should have been allowed into evidence, then, were those made by Connelly to Officer Anderson before Anderson advised Connelly of his rights and took him into custody.
X. CONCLUSION
Balancing the interests of the trial process in determining the guilt or innocence of an accused and the interests of the individual in preventing compelled self-incrimination is, admittedly, a difficult area of constitutional adjudication. established long before those cases were decided. 30 7 These exclusionary rules, however, are not without limits. Under the due process clause, for example, a trial court need not suppress a confession if a suspect confesses in the absence of any coercive actions committed by state agents. Thus, a suspect's mental condition by itself may not invalidate a confession. The Connelly majority, therefore, justifiably limited the definition of "involuntary" statements to those statements resulting from police misconduct. The Court, however, incorrectly concluded that mental condition alone may not invalidate a defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights. Unlike the requirements for a confession under the fourteenth amendment, a waiver of Miranda rights must also be knowing and intelligent. The voluntariness analysis, therefore, protects suspects from fundamentally unfair police misconduct. In contrast, Miranda provides greater protection for the individual: regardless of state action, a suspect may not waive his right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination unless he does so with knowledge of the consequences of his actions.
MICHAEL R. PACE
